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Abstract 
 
Two perspectives dominate the extensive literature on the origins of institutional trust: 
performance and social trust. While the latter argues that social trust creates a 
reservoir of institutional trust, which in turn is beneficial for the stability and 
performance of these institutions, the performance perspective conceives of 
institutional trust as a thermostat of recent economic or political performance. Both 
approaches attempt to theoretically grasp the sources of trust in institutions and 
provide empirical evidence for the impact of social trust or performance, respectively. 
How do we square these two conflicting approaches? I argue and empirically 
demonstrate that while both social trust and performance are important prerequisites 
of trust in political institutions; their relative explanatory weight varies across 
different types of institutions. Whereas performance is the best predictor of trust in 
political institutions, i.e. trust in the executive or political parties, social trust is the 
main determinant of trust in professional institutions, such as the army and the police. 
 
 
 
The author is grateful to Erica Edwards, Andreas Nölke, Barbara Vis and Tijmen de 
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paper. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Trust in political institutions is often viewed as the cornerstone of democratic rule or 
the “cement of democracy” (Stimson 2004: 139). Many argue that institutional trust is 
a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for effective decision-making. It enables 
governments to take new decisions which will, if successful, subsequently boost trust 
in and support for the political regime and its institutions (Easton 1965, 1975; 
Gamson 1968). Trust in institutions is particularly important to democratic regimes as 
these, in contrast to non-democratic regimes, cannot rely on coercion but must instead 
secure voluntary obedience and compliance (Bianco 1994). Moreover, institutional 
trust forms the basis of the representative relationship between electors and their 
representatives and, hence, constitutes a vital component of modern representative 
systems. “It is trust which gives representatives the leeway to ignore short term, 
constituent concerns in order to pursue longer term constituent needs and national 
interests” (Mishler & Rose 1995: 4). Trust in institutions is particularly decisive in 
newly democratized countries, as it serves as a buffer against autocratic regress 
(Badescu & Uslaner 2003). Institutional trust is an essential component for the 
consolidation of newly developed democracies, in that it creates “a reservoir of 
favourable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to 
which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants” 
(Easton 1965: 273). 
What drives trust in institutions? This question has been the focus of continued 
scientific debate, especially in light of the steadily declining levels of popular trust in 
governmental institutions in the United States and Europe (Citrin 1974; Miller 1974; 
Lipset & Schneider 1987; Evans & Whitefield 1995; Mishler & Rose 1995, 1999, 
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2001; Nye et al. 1997; Warren 1999; Gabriel et al. 2002; Newton 2000; Pharr & 
Putnam 2000; Badescu and Uslaner 2003; Bowler & Karp 2004; Keele 2003, 2005; 
Cook & Gronke 2005). To date, two perspectives on the origins of institutional trust 
have evolved: the performance and the social trust approaches.i The latter argues that 
institutional trust is the epiphenomenon of social trust. Institutions can be entrusted 
with power because their incumbents can be trusted. Political elites, in turn, are 
trusted as most citizens in society at large can be trusted. In this understanding, the 
recent decline in institutional trust is highly problematic because it is indicative of a 
more widespread process of political alienation and declining social capital. From a 
social trust perspective, institutional trust symbolizes a barometer of democracy 
(Putnam 1993, 2000; Fukuyama 1995; see also Almond & Verba 1963; Verba 1965).  
Alternatively, the performance approach argues that the decline in popular 
trust in institutions may not necessarily be worrisome; institutional trust merely 
reflects citizens’ perceptions of economic and political performance of institutions. 
Consequently, institutional trust represents a performance thermostat of the political 
system and its institutions. Institutions that perform well economically and politically 
generate trust, whereas poorly performing institutions produce scepticism among 
citizens. In this view, the origins of institutional trust are seen as (primarily) 
politically endogenous (Lipset & Schneider 1983; Evans & Whitefield 1995; Mishler 
& Rose 1995, 1999; Keele 2003, 2005; Stimson 2004). 
Both perspectives attempt to grasp theoretically the sources of trust in 
institutions and provide empirical evidence for the impact of social trust or 
performance. How can we make sense of these conflicting findings? This paper 
contributes to the ongoing debate regarding the origins of institutional trust by 
providing a vital piece to this puzzle. I argue that a differentiation of the institutional 
 5 
trust concept is important in this respect. Institutional trust consists of two dimensions 
representing trust in political institutions (i.e., trust in the executive or political 
parties) and trust in professional institutions (such as the army and the police). While 
both social trust and political performance are important in explaining trust in political 
institutions, their relative explanatory breadth varies across these different types of 
institutions. Whereas social trust is the most important when explaining trust in 
professional institutions, trust in political institutions is best explained in terms of 
their perceived performance by citizens.  
The empirical analysis examines the origins of institutional trust in thirteen 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries.ii Why use these countries in the 
empirical analysis? I argue that these countries provide the most challenging testing 
ground for two reasons. First, it is argued that Eastern European citizens lack 
familiarity with their newly established institutions, which does not allow them to 
discriminate between different types of institutions (Mishler & Rose 2001: 42). For 
this reason, when citizens of CEE countries are able to differentiate between political 
and professional institutions; it seems reasonable to generalize this finding across 
different settings. Second, in light of the communist experience (i.e., these regimes 
undermined trust in institutions through their oppressive politics) and the ongoing 
problems accompanying the transition and consolidation process towards democracy 
and a market economy, skepticism towards institutions prevails, and citizens in CEE 
countries may be less willing to update their views regarding institutions on the basis 
of recent performance (Mishler & Rose 1995, 2001; Rose-Ackerman 2001). Hence, 
performance explanations may prove difficult to find.  
This paper is structured as follows. In the first section, I define the two types 
of institutional trust and argue that in order to gain a more complete understanding of 
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the origins of trust in political institutions one needs to be sensitive to the two-
dimensional nature of the concept. Next, I elaborate the two dominant explanations of 
institutional trust, i.e. performance and social trust, and explicate their relationship to 
the two types of institutional trust by presenting the main hypotheses guiding the 
empirical analysis. The third section provides an overview of data used and the 
operationalization. In a fourth step, I present the results of the empirical analysis. 
Finally, I conclude by discussing the theoretical implications of the empirical results. 
 
 
2. Institutional Trust as a Two-Dimensional Concept 
 
Before elaborating on the definition and two dimensionality of institutional trust, let 
me briefly outline the general understanding of trust underlying this analysis. In line 
with the writings of Gambetta and his colleagues (1988), Coleman (1990), Seligman 
(1997), and Hardin (2002), trust is defined as the belief that others at best will act in 
one’s interests and at worst will not do one any harm. Trust always involves taking 
risks, as one can never be certain that the trust placed in someone will be returned. 
Taking this risk will therefore fundamentally depend on one’s experiences. 
Furthermore, trust is assumed to form the basis of social interaction. In view of the 
complex division of labour which characterises modern societies, social interaction 
can no longer solely be founded on direct face-to-face experience. Trust evolves to 
counterbalance the uncertainty regarding the possible actions of interaction-partners 
(Luhmann 1989, Giddens 1990). Moreover, trust incorporates both a cognitive 
rational as well as an affective emotional dimension. The affective emotional 
dimension results out of socialisation experiences and thus exhibits strong persistence 
over time. Recently, authors have argued that situational factors correct trust 
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relationships developed in early socialisation (see for example Coleman 1990). 
Recent empirical studies using data from Western Europe as well as the United States 
have indeed demonstrated stark fluctuations in trust levels over time (Newton 1999, 
2001b; Kaase 1999; Keele 2005; Cook and Gronke 2005), which substantiates the 
view that citizens rationally update their trust levels. 
The object of interest here is trust in political institutions. Institutional trust 
can be defined as a specific political orientation. Institutional trust incorporates both 
an affective and an evaluative orientation towards political systems (Easton 1965, 
Gamson 1968). Consequently, trust in political institutions can be viewed as a “[…] 
central indicator of the underlying feeling of the general public about its polity” 
(Newton & Norris 2000: 53). In line with Easton, Gamson (1968: 51) differentiates 
three objects of institutional trust, the “political community, political regime and 
political authorities.” The concept of political community stands for “a group of 
persons bound together by a political division of labour” (Easton 1965: 177). Political 
authorities refer to the incumbents of the institutional political structure (Easton 1965: 
206), whilst the term political regime combines the institutional structure as well as 
the values and norms underlying that structure (Easton 1965: 192). The classification 
of institutions within the Eastonean framework remains ambiguous. After assessing 
Easton’s political support theory, Fuchs (1989: 15-6) indicates that the institutions 
should be assigned to the object of the political authorities, as Easton himself often 
makes the distinction between role-incumbents and roles as such. Gabriel (1999: 206) 
follows this distinction, arguing that institutions are made up of fixed and long-lasting 
procedures, tasks, and power structures, unlike the respective incumbents, which are 
merely bound to the authority structures for a short period of time. In this paper, the 
focus will be on trust in institutions rather than in political elites or incumbents. 
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Gabriel (1999) highlights the multidimensional character underlying trust in 
institutions. The author distinguishes two types of institutional trust, namely trust in 
party-based (parteistaatliche) institutions, such as the government and parliament, 
and trust in regulative (regulative) institutions, such as the police or courts (Gabriel 
1999: 206; Gabriel et al. 2002: 180). Trust in party-based institutions is estimated to 
be weaker and less stable than trust in regulative institutions. As opposed to regulative 
institutions, which merely engage in the enforcement and compliance of standing 
policy, party-based institutions are authorised to establish binding decisions and are 
therefore confronted with competing preferences of citizens. This results in lower and 
less stable levels of trust in these institutions, as every binding decision will face its 
supporters and its opponents (Gabriel 1999).  
The decisive criterion in distinguishing between party-based and regulative 
institutions originates out of party involvement within an institution. Following this 
logic, one should find that a respondent’s party preference should matter, i.e. there 
should be a clear differentiation between institutions occupied by government versus 
institutions dominated by opposition parties. This, however, does not match the 
expectation put forward in Gabriel’s work, as he presumes only one party-based 
institutional dimension (Gabriel 1999:206) and his empirical results (Gabriel 1999, 
Gabriel et al. 2002) underline this assumption. Against this backdrop, party-
involvement within an institution may not be the decisive criterion of distinction. 
Whilst Gabriel’s basic idea of differentiating between types of institutions is useful, 
the terms party-based and regulative institutions seem misleading, as they do not 
match the theoretical explanation behind the distinction. Instead, I will use the terms 
political versus professional institutions. Political institutions refer to executive and 
legislative institutions, which are part of the political decision-making process and are 
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hence confronted with conflicting societal demands. Professional institutions focus on 
the implementation of standing policy. These institutions include the police, the 
judiciary, and the army and are confronted with political controversy to a lesser extent 
due to their professional character. The focus on implementation and the professional 
character of these institutions will lead to more stable trust levels.  
 
 
3. Explanations of Institutional Trust: Political Performance and  
Social Trust 
 
As elaborated in the section above, trust includes both a cognitive rational as well as 
an affective emotional dimension. These two dimensions are summarized in the two 
perspectives of institutional trust tested in this analysis, i.e. performance and social 
trust explanations. Whereas the performance model points to the cognitive rational 
component of institutional trust by hypothesizing that institutional trust rests upon the 
effective performance of institutions, the social trust perspective highlights the 
affective emotional dimension of trust in institutions and views institutional trust as an 
epiphenomenon of social trust. The performance explanation of trust is primarily 
based on the writings of Coleman (1990), whereas the social capital theory of Putnam 
(1993) exemplifies the social trust explanation of institutional trust.  
Coleman’s trust concept ties onto rational choice theories, as it assumes actors 
act rationally and aim to maximize their own interests (Misztal 1996:77). “A rational 
actor will place trust if […] the ratio of the chance of gain to the chance of loss is 
greater than the ratio of the amount of the potential loss to the amount of the potential 
gain” (Coleman 1990: 99). According to Coleman, an actor will only place trust in 
and individual or institution if the gain arising from this placement of trust exceeds 
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the loss if his trust was to be abused. Thus, trust becomes a calculation between the 
chance of winning multiplied by the amount of possible gain and the risk of loosing 
multiplied by the amount of possible loss. Two factors are decisive in the 
development of trust relations according to this view of trust. Firstly, an actor has 
incomplete or no information concerning the actions of others. Trust therefore 
functions as a risk-reducing mechanism (Coleman 1990: 102-4; Seligman 1997: 63). 
Secondly, interactions in modern societies are characterised by time lags. Time 
asymmetries exist in the exchange of goods. An actor is no longer able to ascertain 
that the person with whom he interacts will behave in a desirable manner. As such, 
trust poses new risks, as one can never be certain of receiving trust in return (Coleman 
1990: 104). In Coleman’s framework, trust in institutions arises out of positive 
political and economic performance of these institutions. A rational actor will trust 
institutions when these supply him or her with certain material benefits, such as 
economic growth, security, or political stability. This performance view of trust treats 
political trust primarily as politically endogenous. Trust in institutions evolves 
consequent upon the perception among citizens that these perform effectively. Recent 
studies have indeed shown that citizens trust political institutions when these perform 
well economically (and to a lesser extent politically) and citizens withdraw their trust 
when they are dissatisfied about institutional performance (Lipset & Schneider 1987; 
Evans & Whitefield 1995; Mishler & Rose 1995, 1999; Keele 2003). 
This view of trust is criticised by authors who acclaim the concept has a clear 
moral component. They describe trust as a particular form of human interaction, 
evolving from norms which stem from socialisation and societal experience. Trust in 
this view portrays a specific ideal of human cohabitation (Putnam 1993, Fukuyama 
1995). The work by Putnam on social capital highlights the social origins of trust in 
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institutions. The basic idea behind Putnam’s social capital concept is that social trust 
is generalised through engagement in civic networks and therefore enhances norms of 
generalised reciprocity. General patterns of reciprocity are firmly established when 
citizens gain experience in cooperative action and realise that their fellow citizens will 
not take advantage of them. These experiences allow them to act in a more public-
spirited manner and strengthen their willingness to engage in social interactions 
(Putnam 1993: 88-91/171-3; Putnam 2000: 338). Accordingly, trust-norms and civic 
engagement are central to the development of civic virtues, such as institutional trust, 
tolerance, and solidarity, within a community. This system of norms in turn produces 
politically relevant attitudes, such as institutional trust.  
One of the central assumptions of Putnam’s social capital theory is that a 
positive relationship exists between social and institutional trust (Putnam 1993; Pharr 
& Putnam 2000). This hypothesis is by no means new. The relevance of the 
relationship between social and institutional trust was emphasised in the classical 
political culture research. Almond and Verba (1963) emphasized the key function of 
social trust for democratic stability, demonstrating its importance for the conservation 
of a democratic political culture, i.e. a civic culture. On the one hand, social trust 
generates institutional trust and therefore guarantees the legitimacy and stability of a 
political system. On the other hand, it reduces political fragmentation, as it provides 
the establishment of public-spiritedness despite political differences. Finally, social 
trust enables political cooperation among citizens and thus provides societal input 
(Almond & Verba 1963: 490/493). Verba (1965: 535) accentuates the strong 
association between social and political trust; in his view political trust “[…] is likely 
to be closely related to one’s one general view of human nature” (1965: 535).  
 12 
In the social trust approach, trust in political institutions is seen to evolve out 
of the extent to which citizens trust others in society. The relationship between social 
and political trust functions as a key-mechanism in the preservation of the legitimacy 
and stability of a political system, as it is of central to the maintenance of a 
democratic political culture among citizens. Recent studies have demonstrated the 
association between social and political trust (Putnam 1993; Newton 1999, 2000; 
Kaase 1999; Gabriel et al. 2002; Netjes 2002).  
Both the performance and the social trust approaches are found extensively in 
the literature. I argue that the relative explanatory weight of both explanations varies 
across these different types of institutions. Recall that I have distinguished between 
two types of institutional trust: trust in political versus professional institutions. The 
differences between these institutions originate from their diverging competencies and 
functions within the political system. Political institutions refer to executive and 
legislative institutions. Trust in these institutions can be expected to be less stable due 
to the fact that political institutions are part of the ongoing decision-making process 
and have to deal with various conflicting societal demands. In contrast, trust in 
professional institutions, such as the judiciary or the army, is much more stable, as 
these institutions are preoccupied with the implementation of standing policy and are 
less prone to witness day-to-day political controversy. Against this backdrop, I expect 
that performance is more important when explaining popular trust in political 
institutions, whereas trust in professional institutions is much more grounded in social 
trust. I hypothesize that:  
 
H1: Both positive evaluations of the political and economic performance of 
institutions as well as higher levels of social trust are positively related to 
institutional trust.  
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However, I also expect their relative explanatory weight to vary across different types 
of institutions.  
 
H2A: Evaluations of the political and economic performance of institutions 
are more strongly related to trust in political institutions than to social trust. 
 
H2B: However, in the case of trust in professional institutions the opposite is 
true; social trust is more strongly related to trust in professional institutions 
than to performance evaluations. 
 
 
4. Data and Operationalization 
 
These hypotheses will be tested using individual level data pooled across thirteen 
CEE countries. The data used in the empirical analysis is the Post Communist Peoples 
Project (PCP) II dataset. The PCP II data are survey studies initiated by the 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) of citizens in thirteen 
Eastern European political systems following the collapse of communism. They 
focuses on the attitudes, assumptions, values, expectations, preferences, and 
behaviours of representative samples of a wide variety of people interviewed during 
the period ranging from February 1998 in Russia to November 2001 in Estonia.  
Table 1 presents an overview of the operationalization of the main dependent 
and independent variables in the analysis. Institutional performance is measured by 
citizens’ evaluations of the economic and political performance using four different 
indicators: (1) sociotropic economic evaluations, (2) egocentric economic evaluations, 
(3) corruption during present government, and (4) satisfaction with present 
government. With the exception of level of perceived corruption during the present 
government, all of these indicators will be positively related to institutional trust. The 
presence of corruption is an indication of poorly performing political institutions. 
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Hence, institutions plagued by corruption present no incentives for citizens to trust 
them. Corruption undermines the quality of representation and the functioning of 
democratic institutions and can be seen to produce discontent and distrust. Social trust 
is measured by an additive index measuring trust in neighbours and national people.. 
Institutions can be entrusted with power because their incumbents can be trusted. 
Political elites are in turn trusted as most citizens in society at large can be trusted. 
Next to performance and social trust indicators, it is important to incorporate 
several control variables into the analysis. Two types of control variables are 
employed in the regression analysis: authoritarian values and sociodemographics. The 
question regarding the respondent’s evaluation of communism as an idea is used to 
tap into authoritarian attitudes among citizens in CEE countries. Individuals that 
express support for the ideology of the former communist regime are expected to be 
more skeptical of democratic institutions. These citizens are less likely to trust 
democratic institutions than citizens who were not satisfied with the ideology of the 
previous communist regime. 
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Table1: Operationalization of Dependent and Independent Variables: 
Dependent variables Indicator(-s) 
Institutional Trust: 
(1)Trust in Political 
Institutions 
 
 
(2) Trust in Professional 
Institutions 
 
(1) Additive index ranging from 1 = high trust to 16 = scepticism 
measuring trust in five different political institutions: government, 
parliament, political parties, largest party in government and 
largest opposition party (RECODED BETWEEN 0-1) 
(2) Additive index ranging from 1 = high trust to 7 = scepticism 
measuring trust in the police and the army (RECODED 
BETWEEN 0-1) 
Independent variables  Indicator(-s) 
Social Trust 
Explanation: 
(1) Social Trust 
 
 
(1) Additive index ranging from 1 = high trust to 7 = scepticism 
measuring trust in neighbours and national people (i.e. people of 
one’s own language) (RECODED BETWEEN 0-1) 
Performance 
Explanation: 
(1) Sociotropic 
Economic Evaluations 
 
 
(2) egocentric 
Economic Evaluations 
 
 
(3) Corruption during 
Present Government 
 
(4) Satisfaction with 
Present Government 
 
 
(1) Additive index ranging from 1 = improve(d) to 7= get (got) 
worse measuring respondent’s retrospective and prospective 
evaluation of personal economic situation (RECODED 
BETWEEN 0-1) 
(2) Additive index ranging from 1 = improve(d) to 7= get (got) 
worse measuring respondent’s retrospective and prospective 
evaluation of national economic situation (RECODED BETWEEN 
0-1) 
(3) 1 = increased; 2 = remained the same; 3 = declined 
(RECODED BETWEEN 0-1) 
 
(4) Scale ranging from 1 = completely satisfied to 10= completely 
dissatisfied 
Controls: 
(1) Communism Good 
Idea 
(2) Income  
 
(3) Education 
 
(4) Age 
 
 
(1) 1 = yes; 2 = undecided; 3 = no (RECODED BETWEEN 0-1) 
 
(2) 10-point scale ranging from 1 = rich to 10 = poor (RECODED 
BETWEEN 0-1) 
(3) scale indicating the level of education in years spend in school 
(RECODED BETWEEN 0-1) 
(4) Age groups: 1 = 29 and younger 2 = 30-44 3 = 45-59 4 = 60-74 
5 = 75 and older (RECODED BETWEEN 0-1) 
 
 
The second set of control variables measure the influence of respondents’ 
sociodemographic characteristics. Age, education, and income are used as 
demographic controls in the regression analysis. In regard to income and education, 
the basic argument is that while trust relationships always carry a risk, the risk is 
greater for the poor than for the rich (Banfield 1958; Newton 1999; Putnam 2000). 
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According to this line of hypothisizing, the “have-nots” within society, i.e. people 
with a lower income, are less trusting than the “haves,” as they cannot afford to lose 
what little they have were their trust to be betrayed. People with more resources, i.e. 
the haves in society, risk losing less and may gain more from the trust relationship 
(Putnam 2000: 138; Delhey & Newton 2002: 5). Higher levels of income or education 
will thus be positively related to institutional trust. In respect to age, one can argue 
that the communist regimes left a legacy of strong distrust towards institutions due to 
the strong repression and widespread corruption within these regimes (Rose et al. 
1997). Nowak (1981) refers to this process of the shifting of trust solely into the 
private domain as the “social vacuum.” As nothing could be expected from the 
institutions under communism, people withdrew into the private domain of family and 
friends (Nowak 1981: 29-30). Age is expected to have a negative impact on 
institutional trust. 
 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
 
Before I examine the relationship between institutional trust, social trust, and 
performance, I first need to examine the applicability of the hypothesized two-
dimensional nature of institutional trust. The dimensionality of the indicators of 
institutional trust used in this analysis is tested using a scaling procedure called 
Mokken Scale Analysis for Polychotomous Items (MSP).iii The Mokken scaling model 
is a stochastic generalisation of the deterministic Guttnam scale model (Niemöller & 
Van Schuur 1983;Van der Eijk & Oppenhuis 1996; Gerich 2001). The Mokken model 
is a so-called latent-trait model and hence assumes “[…] that the observed values of 
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indicators can be accounted for in a relatively simple way by values of indicators and 
of observation units on a common, unidimensional attribute” (Niemöller & Van 
Schuur 1983: 121). It is important to note that two different Mokken scale analysis 
procedures exist: a test and search procedure. The test procedure functions as an 
evaluation of a set of items as an a-priori theoretical defined scale. The search 
procedure, on the other hand, is an inductive method that investigates the 
dimensionality within a given pool of items and stepwise constructs one or more 
scales (Debets & Brouwer 1989).  
These Mokken scale analyses provide two important pieces of information, i.e. 
two scalability coefficients: Hi, which serves as an indication of the goodness-of-fit 
for each item with respect to all other items in the scale, and H, which indicates the 
goodness-of-fit for the scale as a whole. The value of these scalability coefficients can 
be interpreted in the following manner (see Niemöller & Van Schuur 1983:132):  
 H/Hi  0.50: a strong scale 
 0.40  H/Hi < 0.50: a medium scale 
 0.30  H/Hi < 0.40: a weak scale 
 H/Hi < 0.30: no scale  
 
The results of the search and test procedures are presented in table 2. In the search 
procedure a scale condition was formulated, i.e. the scalability coefficients should be 
greater than or equal to 0.40. The first column in table 2 presents the results of the 
search procedure using Mokken scaling analysis. Using the search procedure only one 
institutional trust scale was extracted, excluding the items trust in political parties and 
trust in the largest opposition parties as their scalability coefficients were lower than 
the cut-off point of 0.40. The scale coefficient of the single institutional trust 
dimension, i.e. the H in the first column of table 2, signifies that the institutional trust 
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dimension is a strong scale (H  0.50). The results of the search procedure, however, 
are not sufficient to examine the operationalization of the specific trust dimensions as 
presented in table 1. The scale construction results in a search procedure that is based 
merely on a mathematical definition of such a scale and, hence, cannot function as a 
substitute for theory-based analysis (Debets & Brouwer 1989). 
 
Table 2: Results of Mokken Scaling Analysis: 
 Search Procedure Test procedure 
Items Hi Hi 
Trust in Parliament 0.57 0.35 
Trust in Largest Party in 
Government 
0.51 0.49 
Trust in Political Parties  0.43 
Trust in Government 0.51 0.43 
Trust in Police 0.50  
Trust in Army 0.44  
Trust in Largest Opposition 
Party 
 0.25 
H 0.51 0.40 
Trust in Police  0.52 
Trust in Army  0.52 
H  0.54 
 
 
To be able to sufficiently determine the correctness of the hypothesized 
institutional trust dimensions, one also needs to check these assumptions using a test 
procedure. These results are presented in the second column in table 2 and allow an 
evaluation of the a-priori theoretically defined trust dimensions representing trust in 
political and trust in professional institutions. The results indicate that the 
hypothesized trust dimensions fit the dimensionality in the data very well. The test-
procedure extracted two different scales. These two dimensions refer to the different 
dimensions of institutional trust, i.e. trust in political institutions and trust in 
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professional institutions. The scale coefficients in the second column of table 2 
signify that trust in political institutions is a medium scale (0.40  H < 0.50), whereas 
trust in professional institutions is a strong scales (H  0.50). Although the results of 
the search procedure indicate that respondents in CEE countries do not necessarily 
differentiate between political and professional institutions, the test procedure results 
support the theoretically proposed two-dimensional character of institutional trust. 
These two types of institutional trust are homogenous as the several indicators do 
form the expected dimensions. Hence, I will use the results of the test procedure in 
this analysis and construct two institutional trust scales. 
Table 3 contains the results of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple 
regression analyses using trust in political and trust in professional institutions as the 
dependent variable. I tested for multicollinearty or hetroscedasticity after running the 
regression analyses. Neither of the two regression analyses suffers from 
multicollinearty or hetroscedasticity problems. Before I interpret the results of the 
multiple regression analyses, it is important to note that all of the scales for the 
predictors as well as the two dependent variables have been recoded to a 0-1 scale. 
The rescaling of the predictors allows me to compare the strength of the indicators of 
the social trust and performance explanations within the models, while the rescaling 
of the dependent variables allows me to compare between the two different regression 
analyses. The explanatory power of these two different models differs considerably. 
Whereas 39 percent of the variance of trust in political institutions in CEE countries 
can be explained by the respective predictors in these models, the same explanatory 
model performs worse in the case of trust in professional institutions. The same 
predictors account for merely 15 percent of the variance in trust in professional 
institutions in CEE countries. In all, we can conclude that the social trust and 
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performance explanations do a much better job in explaining variation in the levels of 
trust in political institutions than is the case for trust in professional institutions.  
 The examination of the individual regression parameters in the different 
models demonstrates substantial support for the first hypothesis (H1). Both social 
trust and political performance boost institutional trust. In the case of the performance 
explanation, the analyses show that sociotropic economic evaluations and satisfaction 
with the present government have significant positive effects on the degree of 
institutional trust. The perception that the current government is plagued by 
corruption, however, has a negative effect on institutional trust. Moreover, the 
inclusion of controls does not produce large changes in the effects of the social trust 
and performance indicators.  
Table 3: Determinants of Trust in Institutions: 
Model Trust Political 
Institutions 
Trust Professional 
Institutions 
Parameters    
Social Trust Explanation: 
 
Social Trust 
 
 
 
0.214* 
(0.017) 
 
 
0.341* 
(0.025) 
Performance Explanation: 
 
Sociotropic Economic 
Evaluations 
 
Egotropic Economic 
Evaluations 
 
 
 
0.111* 
(0.013) 
 
0.021 
(0.014) 
 
 
0.072* 
(0.022) 
 
0.016 
(0.020) 
Corruption during Present 
Government 
 
-0.207* 
(0.031) 
-0.269* 
(0.045) 
Satisfaction with Present 
Government 
 
0.158* 
(0.010) 
0.071* 
(0.015) 
Controls: 
 
Communism Good Idea 
 
 
-0.039* 
(0.021) 
 
 
-0.017 
(0.032) 
Age 
 
-0.004* 
(0.001) 
-0.005* 
(0.002) 
Income 
 
-0.029* 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.018) 
Education 
 
0.005 
(0.010) 
0.061* 
(0.016) 
Constant 5.250* 
(0.160) 
3.348* 
(0.241) 
       Adjusted R² 0.36 0.15 
       N 5100 5350 
Note: Cell entries are OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05 (one-
tailed) 
 
The direction and significance of our main predictors are identical across the 
different model specifications. The only differences concern the effects of the control 
variables. Whereas the impact of opinions regarding the former communist regime 
and income levels are significant in the case of political institutions, these predictors 
do not reach significance in the model estimating the determinants of trust in 
professional institutions. In addition, the impact of education differs across the two 
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models; education levels are only significant predictors of trust in professional 
institutions.  
The results also indicate that the relative weight of the social trust and political 
performance explanations differs across the two types of institutional trust, which is in 
line with the second set of hypotheses (H2A and H2B). Since the scales of the 
predictors were recoded to a 0-1 format, the relative explanatory strengths of the 
predictors within and across models can be compared. To further evaluate the 
magnitude of the changes in trust levels due to the effects of the main social trust and 
political performance predictors, I utilized CLARIFY to calculate the difference in the 
expected value of the dependent variable when a respective explanatory variable is 
moved from its minimum to its maximum level and, all other variables are held at 
their means. CLARIFY uses Monte Carlo simulations to convert raw statistical results 
into more intuitive and reader-friendly quantities without changing the statistical 
assumptions (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000).iv Figure 1 shows the difference in 
the respective trust levels when the five main predictors are moved from their 
minimum to their maximum value. 
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Figure 1: Change in Institutional Trust Levels by Main Predictors 
 
Figure 1 provides strong evidence for both H2A and H2B. Whereas political 
performance has the greatest effect when explaining the origins of trust in political 
institutions, social trust is the largest explanatory factor of trust in professional 
institutions. However, their relative explanatory weight differs substantively across 
the two types of institutional trust. In the case of trust in political institutions, the 
figure shows that satisfaction with the present government is the strongest predictor. 
When satisfaction with the present government increases from its minimum (0) to its 
maximum value (1), trust in political institutions increases 20.3 percent after 
controlling for authoritarian values and socio-demographics. Social trust is the second 
best predictor in the model. A change in the social trust indicator from its minimum to 
its maximum level results in an 18.3 percent increase in support for political 
institutions. Although performance is the strongest explanatory factor of trust in 
political institutions, social trust considerations also play an important role.  
In the case of trust professional institutions, the results reported in figure 1 
show that social trust is by far the most influential predictor. If social trust increases 
from its minimum value of 0 to its maximum value of 1, this is followed by a 28.6 
percent increase in trust in professional institutions after controlling for authoritarian 
values and socio-demographics. The four performance indicators play a much smaller 
role in explaining trust in professional institutions. The strongest performance 
indicator of trust in professional institutions is satisfaction with the present 
government. An increase in a respondent’s satisfaction with the implementation of 
democracy in one’s country from its minimum to its maximum value corresponds 
with a 9.1 percentage point increase in trust in professional institutions.  
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These outcomes contradict other studies concerning the relationship between 
performance, social trust, and institutional trust in CEE countries (see Mishler & Rose 
1995, 1999, 2001; Rose-Ackerman 2001). These studies found weak relationships 
between social and institutional trust and strong relationships between performance 
evaluations and institutional trust. However, one should keep in mind that these 
studies did not differentiate between different dimensions of trust in political 
institutions. A more recent study by Gabriel and his colleagues (2002: 191) 
incorporating countries from both Eastern and Western Europe did find positive 
relationships between social trust and the two types of institutional trust as well as 
performance of political institutions and types of institutional trust. The discrepancy 
between the studies of Mishler and Rose (1995, 1999, and 2001), on the one hand, 
and the Gabriel et al. study (2002) and the findings presented here, on the other hand, 
can largely be explained by the difference in conceptualisation and measurement of 
political trust. Whereas this study, in line with Gabriel and his colleagues, specifies 
several dimensions of political trust, Mishler and Rose did not differentiate between 
several political trust attitudes. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Why do people trust or no trust institutions? To date, the literature on institutional 
trust has provided two answers to this question. First, citizens are expected to trust 
institutions when they feel that most citizens in society at large can be trusted. Hence, 
social trust creates a reservoir of trust in institutions, which in turn is beneficial for the 
stability and performance of these institutions. The second answer highlights the 
importance of performance for institutional trust. Institutions that perform 
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economically and politically well generate trust, whereas poorly performing 
institutions result in a withdrawal of trust among citizens. A large array of studies 
have shown the empirical validity of both approaches. This paper shows that indeed 
both social trust and performance are important prerequisites of institutional trust, but 
their relative explanatory impact is conditional on the type of institution.  
 Institutional trust consists of two dimensions representing trust in political 
institutions and trust in professional institutions. The empirical findings highlight the 
importance of understanding institutional trust as a two-dimensional concept, as the 
explanatory strength of the social trust and performance predictors differs between the 
two types. Although both types of institutional trust are a function of the evaluation of 
the performance of institutions as well as of social trust, the social trust explanation 
clearly outperforms performance in the case of professional institutions. However, 
economic and political performance carries a greater explanatory weight than social 
trust when explaining trust in political institutions. Political institutions have to make 
choices among conflicting preferences of citizens when they draft and design policies. 
This makes them more prone to evaluations on the basis of their economic and 
political performance. Trust in political institutions can be expected to be less stable 
due to the fact that these institutions have to deal with various conflicting societal 
demands. Professional institutions, on the other hand, focus on the implementation of 
standing policy. They are not part of electoral cycle and therefore lesser extent 
confronted with conflicting preferences of citizens. This weakens the relationship 
between performance-based evaluation of professional institutions and trust in these 
institutions. Trust in professional institutions is much more stable, as these institutions 
are preoccupied with the implementation of standing policy and are less prone to be 
associated with day-to-day political controversy. 
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The data used in this analysis covers institutional trust in thirteen CEE countries. This 
case selection provides the most difficult check regarding the two-dimensionality of 
institutional trust and the respective influence of performance and social trust on the 
levels of popular trust for these different sets of institutions. The findings reported 
here indicate that counter to prior expectations (Mishler & Rose 1995, 2001; Rose-
Ackerman 2001); Eastern European citizens are very able to distinguish among types 
of institutions based on their diverging competencies and functions within the 
political system. Moreover, the sources of institutional trust of citizens in CEE 
countries correspond to the theoretical expectations stemming from the North 
American and Western European literature. 
The analysis presented here provides a first step in understanding the 
conditions under which performance of social trust explains variation in institutional 
trust. Further avenues of research should be addressed. For example, one could 
investigate the sources of institutional trust over time using time-series analysis. 
Without a doubt, perceptions of institutional performance will vary across time. 
Hence, a time-series model may provide extra depth to the findings presented here. 
Moreover, employing a multilevel model may also yield interesting results. This 
method allows the incorporation of country-level effects, such as macro-economic 
conditions or corruption levels. Finally, a recent study has shown that institutional 
trust may also be conditional on partisanship. In this context of the United States, 
Keele (2005) for instance shows that partisans trust government more when their 
party controls Congress or the presidency. Hence, one may expect perceptions of 
institutional performance to be biased by the party preference of citizens and the 
respective party control of government. 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                 
i
 It is important to note that recent studies have also highlighted the mediating impact of partisanship or 
ideology on trust in institutions. Most prominently, Keele shows that trust in government varies across 
partisans on the basis of party control of Congress and/or the presidency (2005). In this paper, however, 
I will focus exclusively on performance and social trust explanations. 
ii
 The countries included in this analysis are: Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Ukraine. 
iii
 The Mokken scale analyses documented in table 2 were obtained using the computer program MSP, 
for further information about this software see Debets & Brouwer (1989). 
iv
 CLARIFY 2.1 is a STATA application that can be downloaded form Gary King’s website: 
http://gking.harvard.edu/clarify/. 
